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defended on the merits in the district court. He attacked the
transfers only after losing the case there.
The court found that the constitutional provision superseded
the CPLR requirement, and did eliminate the method of transfer
by consent. In spite of the fact that the original service would not
have conferred jurisdiction on the lower courts, it was held that
since the defendant appeared and defended without objection, he
became one of the 4classes
of persons over whom the court had
7
personal jurisdiction.
N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 19(a): Consent of surrogate not needed
to effect transfer.
Under the CPLR,4 the supreme court may transfer an action
pending before it to the surrogate's court if the case involves a
decedent's estate within the latter court's jurisdiction. A prerequisite for this transfer has been the consent of the surrogate to
receive the action. Although this consent was usually obtainable,
when the facilitation of litigation. 49 or the prevention of calendar
delays in the supreme court 50 warranted transfer, it remained
discretionary with the surrogate.5
Recently, the appellate division, first department, in Garland v.
Raunhein,52 indicated that the general transfer provision of the
amended judiciary article of the Constitution 5 3 has, by failure to
mention consent as a requirement, eliminated it. After stating that
the CPLR transfer section had been superseded by the constitutional
provision, the court ordered the transfer of a partition action
brought in the supreme court to the surrogate's court without any
mention of requesting or obtaining the surrogate's consent.
Although this decision seems warranted by the language of
the amendment, in a few instances the consent of the surrogate
has been sought on a voluntary basis. 5 4 Moreover, consent of the
surrogate is still needed for the transfer of cases from the supreme
court in one department to a surrogate's court in another, since
4' Martin v. Farrell, 47 Misc. 2d 126, 261 N.Y.S.2d 820 (County Ct.

Essex County 1965).
449 CPLR 325(d). Parallel provisions appear in SCPA § 209 and § 501.
Shearn v. Lord, 16 Misc. 2d 224, 156 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1956), aff'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 823, 161 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1st Dep't 1957).
5OSee In re Mayer, 158 N.Y.L.J. 13 (Surr. Ct. Westchester County
July5 1 18, 1967).
n re Laedke, 28 Misc. 2d 651, 210 N.Y.S2d 180 (Surr. Ct. Nassau
County 1961).
5229 App. Div. 2d 383, 288 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1st Dep't 1968).
53 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 19(a). This result was predicted by the commentator in 58A McICNEY's SCPA § 209, commentary 210-11 (1967).
54In re Suchoff, 55 Misc. 2d 284, 285 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Surr. Ct. Nassau
County 1967); In re Breen, 45 Misc. 2d 374, 256 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Surr. Ct.
Richmond County 1965).
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

the constitutional provision applies only to intra-departmental
transfers.5
ARTICLE 4

-SPECIAL

PROCEEDINGS

CPLR 403: Service of order to show cause in specified manner
does not create jurisdictional predicate.
A special proceeding may be instituted either by service of a
notice of petition, in the same manner as a summons, or by an
order to show cause, which is served in any manner specified by
the court.'; When the latter procedure is chosen, it has been held
that failure to follow the designated method of service is a jurisdictional defect.5 7 However, this does not mean that service of the
order in the specified manner will of itself give jurisdiction over
the defendant.
Application of Kay,5s a proceeding to determine the custody
of children of a divorced couple illustrates this proposition. The
children were living with the defendant-wife, in Belgium, at the
time of the proceeding's commencement.5 9 Therefore, the trial
court directed service of the order to show cause by what seemed
the only feasible method,60 i.e., service by mail on the defendant in
Belgium, and personal service on her attorneys.
The appellate division, first department, held that literal compliance with these instructions could not, per se, confer personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. 6' Unless a hearing shows that the
defendant maintained a New York residence at the time the
proceeding commenced, no jurisdictional basis exists, and the mere
service of the order to show cause does not create one.

55 This discrepancy
in the treatment of inter- and intra-departmental
transfers could be eliminated if the Legislature passed the law authorized
by § 19(g) of the judiciary Article, extending the constitutional transfer
power to transfers between departments.
GOCPLR 304, 403(c), (d).
5
In re Graffagnino, 48 Misc. 2d 441, 264 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1965). For a discussion of this case see The Quarterly Survey
of New York Practice, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 121, 133-34 (1966).
5829 App. Div. 2d 937, 289 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1st Dep't 1968).
SoThere was no continuing jurisdiction predicated on a New York
divorce, such as was found in Schneidman v. Schneidman, 188 Misc.
765, 65 N.Y.S.2d 876 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1946), since the parties
were
6 divorced in Mexico.
O"An order to show cause permits the court to make provisions for
special problems that may arise as to time, service and parties ...
TH RD REP. 157.
61 CPLR 313.

